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Abstract 
What is it like to be a bat? What is it like to be sick? These two questions 
are much closer to one another than has hitherto been acknowledged. 
Indeed, both raise a number of related, albeit very complex, philosophical 
problems. In recent years, the phenomenology of health and disease has 
become a major topic in bioethics and the philosophy of medicine, owing 
much to the work of Havi Carel (2007, 2011, 2018). Surprisingly little 
attention, however, has been given to the phenomenology of animal health 
and suffering. This omission shall be remedied here, laying the groundwork 
for the phenomenological evaluation of animal health and suffering. 
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 1 Introduction 
What is it like to be a bat?1 What is it like to be sick? These two questions are 
much closer to one another than has hitherto been acknowledged. Indeed, both 
raise a number of related, albeit very complex, philosophical problems. Within the 
literature, there is a common tendency to draw a distinction between ‘disease’ and 
‘illness’. While disease is often taken to be an objective judgement (i.e. one of 
pathology), illness is taken to involve the subjective experience of pathological 
states: i.e. an awareness that something is ‘wrong’ with one’s body, often through 
the experience of pain. In recent years, the phenomenology of health and disease 
has become a major topic in bioethics and the philosophy of medicine, owing 
much to the work of Havi Carel (2007, 2011, 2018). Surprisingly little attention, 
however, has been given to the phenomenology of animal health and suffering, an 
omission that shall be remedied here. Drawing on empirical work such as 
Qualitative Behavioural Assessment (QBA), phantom limb pain and self-
medication by animals, we argue that a phenomenological approach to animal 
health can provide a far richer understanding of what it means for an animal to be 
in a pathological state. 
This chapter is organized as follows: in Section Two we begin by briefly 
outlining the phenomenological tradition. In Section Three we survey the 
phenomenological tradition from Merleau-Ponty to Havi Carel and the application 
of embodied phenomenology to the phenomenology of illness, thus building the 
groundwork to apply the tools of phenomenology to animals. Section Four shows 
how, despite the inability of animals to verbalize their subjective experience, we 
can use embodied measures to understand their phenomenology. Section Five 
illustrates how the phenomenology of animal health and suffering should impact 
our treatment of other animals, before we finally conclude the chapter in Section 
Six with a call for perspectival pluralism regarding animal experience, particularly 
health and suffering, with the inclusion of a phenomenological perspective. 
 
2 The Phenomenological Tradition 
Phenomenology, born in the early twentieth century, is a rather young 
philosophical tradition that studies the nature of experience and consciousness. It 
is thus somewhat opposed to an older philosophical tradition going back as far as 
Ancient Greece, that was concerned with the nature of reality - i.e. how things 
 
1 Thomas Nagel employed this phrase in his famous paper: “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” 
(1974) The Philosophical Review 83(4): 435–50. 
 really are, rather than how they appear to us. Phenomena are thus the centre of 
attention: how do things appear to us or, more generally, to any conscious beings? 
Havi Carel (2011) goes so far as to call it “the science (logos) of relating 
consciousness to phenomena (things as they appear to us) rather than to pragmata 
(things as they are)” (34). 
While we think this is stretching the definition of science - after all, Carel 
notes that phenomenology is more of a practice than a system - there is an 
important sense in which phenomenology can be understood as a science: that is 
via its links to the emerging science of sentience and consciousness. This link will 
later become important when we draw on phenomenological work to enrich 
research on animal welfare and health.2 Proponents of the phenomenological 
tradition in philosophy praise its metaphysical modesty: 
“[Phenomenology] focuses on the data available to human 
consciousness while bracketing metaphysical debates and ontological 
commitments. Classical phenomenology does not posit this data as 
empirical, real, or absolute, but rather, as transcendental. [...] It 
simply describes the mental activity taking place in different acts of 
consciousness, such as perceiving, thinking, knowing, imagining, and 
so on. Because of its metaphysical modesty, phenomenology can be 
applied to a range of philosophical problems and be used compatibly 
with a range of metaphysical views.” 
– Havi Carel (2011, 34) 
Indeed, phenomenological approaches have been used in diverse fields such as 
“sociology, film studies, anthropology, nursing, musicology, and others” (Carel 
2011, 34). But as both this list and the quote above make abundantly clear, 
phenomenology traditionally conceived is about human experience. Carel (2011) 
doubles down on this point, stating that phenomenology is a method “for 
discerning and describing human experience” (34). Phenomenology can thus be 
understood as a practice, a method, and a science. But perhaps it is more accurate 
to see the term as an umbrella term for a set of positions, works, and thinkers with 
a rather loose family resemblance.  
There is no reason to think that phenomenology must be about humans, 
despite assertions that can be interpreted to the contrary: “[m]an can never be an 
animal; his life is always more or less integrated than that of an animal” (Merleau-
 
2 We follow the biomedical and bioethical tradition and take these concepts to be distinct 
(see Veit 2018b,c,d). 
 Ponty 1983, 181).3 While both Edmund Husserl and Merleau-Ponty wrote much 
of value about the lives of animals, they held that their points of view will be in 
an important sense closed off from human understanding. Some of their followers 
were more optimistic, with some in this tradition even trying to apply 
phenomenology to plants (Marder 2012). Such views have, unfortunately, 
remained at the fringe of both the phenomenological tradition and mainstream in 
philosophy. Work in phenomenology at large, has turned most of its attention 
away from animals – partially due to assumption that we cannot know what their 
life would be like. We consider this a self-imposed barrier, rather than a limit 
inherent to the method. In order to apply phenomenology to animals, however, we 
need to loosen these self-imposed shackles, as we begin to do in this chapter. Here, 
we take Havi Carel’s (2007; 2011; 2018) work on the phenomenology of illness 
to provide a useful starting point towards discussion of phenomenology of animal 
health and suffering. 
 
3 What is it like to be? 
Prior to Havi Carel, only a small number of authors worked on the phenomenology 
of illness, yet it is important to also recognize their contributions. One noticeable 
pioneer of this approach was Richard Zaner (1981, 2005), who sought proximity 
to medical practice. Indeed, he worked as a clinical ethicist in a university hospital, 
which directly influenced his ‘clinical ethics’. As Carel (2011) notes, the journal 
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics dedicated an entire special issue to his work, 
highlighting the importance he attributed to the ‘clinical encounter’ with patients 
and families of patients (see Wiggins and Schwartz 2005; Wiggins and Sadler 
2005). This focus is of less relevance when we are concerned with wild animals 
suffering from disease and injury, rather than human patients. Yet, there could be 
an interesting lens for animals in captivity that come into contact with 
veterinarians – a point we will briefly address in Section Four. Further important 
contributors in this area are Svenaeus (2000a,b, 2001) and Toombs (1988, 1987, 
2001), the latter of whom has taken an explicitly transcendental approach and is 
thus perhaps farthest from the ideas we present here.  
While there is much variety among these accounts, there is a unifying core 
to this foregoing work that Carel (2011) argues is best characterized as a 
recognition that we “need a phenomenological approach that can account for the 
 
3 We can make little sense out of the claim that the life of a human is always more or less 
integrated than that of an animal. The life of a bat would also always be more or less 
integrated than that of a salamander. 
 body’s central role in human life and acknowledge the primacy of perception” 
(35). This leads Carel to build her account on the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
(1908–1961) who developed an explicitly embodied phenomenology. 
 
3.1 Embodied Phenomenology 
An important key in Carel’s work is a sort of neutrality regarding the requirement 
that phenomenology must be about transcendental rather than empirical 
experience, arguing that: “[f]or the purposes of describing the experience of 
illness, it is enough to consider the general features of illness without insisting on 
the transcendental nature of its features” (35). Her views can thus possibly be 
described as a recognition that phenomenology can be a highly useful tool, even 
if one makes no (or only sparse) use of its transcendental history. After all, she 
recognizes that other phenomenologists have denied or downplayed the 
importance of its transcendental foundation. This is perhaps best illustrated 
through the anti-cognitivist movement within cognitive science, that can trace its 
origin back to Merleau-Ponty. Before we do so, however, let us take a closer look 
at Carel’s usage of Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodied phenomenology. 
Merleau-Ponty (1962) describes human experience as having a sort of 
looping effect, grounding it in perceptual experience, which in turn is grounded as 
an embodied activity. Carel (2011) argues that this is “not just an empirical claim 
about perceptual activity but a transcendental view that posits the body as the 
condition of possibility for perception and action” (35). The body is thus the origin 
of the “expressive movement itself, that which causes them to begin to exist as 
things, under our hands and eyes” (Merleau-Ponty 1962,  162). Here, Carel points 
to Gallagher and Zahavi (2008) who consider the body “a constitutive or 
transcendental principle, precisely because it is involved in the very possibility of 
experience” (135). We dislike talk of the transcendental, for it invites conceptual 
ambiguities and carries a heavy load of historical baggage. Talk of the constitutive 
role of our bodies in experience, on the other hand, is more neutral and thus less 
problematic.  
For Merleau-Ponty, it is our body’s sensory experience that holds the key 
to subjectivity. While a denial of this intuitive idea may not be considered 
especially insightful today, philosophers in the mainstream have only recently 
started to take the idea seriously, sometimes explicitly citing Merleau-Ponty as 
their influence. As Godfrey-Smith (2016) argues: 
 
Though the idea that our actions affect what we perceive seems 
routine and familiar, philosophers through many centuries did not 
 treat it as especially important. In philosophy, this is the territory of 
unorthodoxies, of works beside, rather than within, the main 
development of ideas. That is true even in recent years. Instead, a 
huge amount of work has looked at a small piece of the total picture; 
it has looked at the link between what comes in through the senses 
and the thoughts or beliefs that result. Little was usually said about 
the link to action, and even less about the way action affects what you 
sense next. 
– Peter Godfrey-Smith (2016, p. 80-81) 
Carel (2011), likewise, highlights how influential Merleau-Ponty’s views were at 
the time, stating that his idea of understanding human nature through our body and 
perception was a “radical one in the context of the history of philosophy, in which 
rationalism and an emphasis on a disembodied mind have been central” (p. 36). 
Indeed, his ideas are still considered radical, but may well hold the key to 
understanding not only human illness, but as we argue, also animal illness and 
suffering.  
Perhaps something like this is already implicit in the work of many 
phenomenologists when they speak of “the kind of creature we are” (Carel 2011, 
p. 36), experiences being shaped by our bodies and brains, and the unity between 
minds and bodies. Carel (2011) seemingly makes this explicit, when she asserts 
that Merleau-Ponty provides us with a more “organic view of the human being as 
a human animal” that seeks to place the “body as the seat and sine qua non of 
human existence” (36-37). That we are “perceiving, feeling, and thinking 
animal[s]” (36) is indeed a more organic - i.e. biological - view than is usually 
found in traditional philosophy. Yet, we should stress here that this recognition of 
a continuity between humans and other animals is unfortunately not a core feature 
of phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty scholar Ted Toadvine (2014) notes that: 
 
It is precisely this common animal sensibility that is repeatedly 
contested in the development of phenomenology after Husserl, in 
different ways and with different stakes, by Scheler, Heidegger, 
Sartre, and Levinas. Arguably, it is only Merleau-Ponty, among the 
major phenomenologists of the twentieth century, who endorses 
something like an animal stratum of the human and finds in it the 
basis for what he will eventually call a “strange kinship” (1995, 
339/2003, 271). 
– Ted Toadvine (2014) 
 3.2 Merleau-Ponty and Animal Phenomenology 
While it is Merleau-Ponty who among the major phenomenologists takes the most 
time to discuss animals, he only discusses them extensively in his first book The 
Structure of Behavior.4 Ted Toadvine (2007) hypothesizes that similar to 
Heidegger’s (1962) Being and Time, Merleau-Ponty’s early work might simply be 
intended as an illumination of the more ‘private mode of existence’: something 
we share with other animals, but that is ultimately only a small part of human 
experience. This is not Toadvine’s preferred explanation, however, as it stands in 
conflict with Merleau-Ponty’s final lecture on nature where he asserts that “there 
is no break between the planned animal, the animal that plans, and the animal 
without plan” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 176): 
Rather than starting from human perceptual consciousness and 
working backward, privatively, to disclose the essential structures of 
animal life, Merleau-Ponty starts from animal life and its Umwelt to 
demonstrate that Being is constitutively phenomenal. 
– Ted Toadvine (2007, 18) 
This analysis of Merleau-Ponty is a highly interesting one, for it shows his 
admiration for Edmund Husserl who describes the constitution of Being in 
precisely this order (see Beyer 2018; Husserl 1913; 1980; 1989), and it suggests 
that he might have been one of the earliest philosophers to attempt to provide a 
naturalized account of phenomenology.5  
There is thus an odd alliance between the more biologically-informed and -
oriented philosophies found in Godfrey-Smith (2016), Dennett (2017), and 
Ginsburg and Jablonka (2019), and embodied phenomenology in the tradition of 
Merleau-Ponty. Both share a common thread of attack against traditional 
‘rationalist’ philosophy and instead seek to ground consciousness in nature, rather 
than human conscious experience. One might describe this as a bottom-up rather 
than top-down approach. Godfrey-Smith (2016) is thus right when he recognizes 
that the approach he and other naturalists follow is only now moving into the 
mainstream of philosophy, giving perhaps too little credit to its precursors in the 
phenomenological tradition. 
 
4 See Toadvine (2007) for an extended discussion on the Human-Animal relationship in 
Merleau-Ponty. 
5 Indeed, Merleau-Ponty was directly influenced by the German psychologist Wolfgang 
Köhler, who studied chimpanzee cognition (see Toadvine 2019). 
 As alluded to previously, the role of embodiment is taken seriously in much 
of the recent work in the cognitive sciences, and some have even attempted to 
naturalize phenomenology.6 It is within this tradition that Carel locates her work 
on the phenomenology of illness. Yet, she also claims that the “experience of 
illness cannot be captured within a naturalistic view” (Carel 2007, 95).  
Here, it can be tricky to draw a distinction between those that try to provide 
a naturalized account of first-person experience (i.e. consciousness or sentience) 
and those who come from within the phenomenological tradition. We are not 
interested in drawing such a distinction here, yet remain faithfully in the camp that 
treats our first-person experience as something that can be explained and 
understood using the tools of science. We see the parts of phenomenology we 
draw on here as within science, rather than outside of it. Let us now turn to the 
phenomenology of illness, which can further illustrate this point. 
 
3.3 What is it like to be ill? 
Pathologies can be described entirely in objective-naturalist terms from a third-
person point of view, but yet they are also experienced from a first-person 
perspective. Phenomenology is associated with someone's first-person experience. 
The phenomenology of illness is thus the ‘what it is like’-ness or subjective 
experience of being in a pathological state. This is particularly problematic for 
animals as if we want to understand animal illness, how could we possibly gain 
access to the subjective experience of non-human animals? 
Carel (2007) argues that the naturalist account of disease and pathology as 
mere dysfunction is not enough to account for the experience of illness, leading 
medical practitioners to discount the perspectives of patients.7 Here, Merleau-
Ponty’s embodied phenomenology plays a key role. Carel (2011) describes it as a 
“fleshly physical existence” (39), which is also reflected in the title of her later 
book llness: The Cry of Flesh (2018). Illness is a lived experience and has a 
distinct phenomenological character. With this we agree. While there is a link 
between being in a pathological state and experiencing pain and suffering, this 
need not be. Animals, just like humans, can be happy despite being in a 
pathological state. While it is hard to conduct scientific studies on these matters, 
 
6 See for instance the collected volume by Jan Petitot and Roy (1999). 
7 An instance of this is the failure of researchers to take the perspectives of the entire 
autism spectrum seriously (see Chapman and Veit 2020). 
 we should not discard the evidence coming from anecdotal reports of zookeepers, 
veterinarians, and animal researchers more generally.8 
An example Carel (2011) draws from Merleau-Ponty is the phenomenon of 
phantom limbs. Phantom limbs are still considered a mysterious phenomenon in 
science (Kaur and Guan, 2018). How is it that we can have sensory experiences 
from a limb that has been amputated? Here, embodied phenomenology provides 
an answer: “[t]o have a phantom arm is to remain open to all the actions of which 
the arm alone is capable; it is to retain the practical field which one enjoyed before 
mutilation” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 81-82). Objectively the body part is gone, but 
the subject retains the subjective experience of having an arm - a sort of ‘what is 
it like to have an arm’-ness remains. Carel (2011) expands on this example and 
argues that a “phantom limb is the expression, based on years of having a body 
image and a body schema with four limbs, of the body as it used to be. The habitual 
body is a relationship to an environment and to a set of abilities that are no longer 
available to the amputee” (40). This is further supported by the current 
classification of phantom limb pain as just one sub-part of the more general 
phantom complex (PC) phenomenon, which can include any bodily sensation 
apparently coming from an absent limb (Menchetti et al. 2017). 
We have little doubt that there is much to gain from a phenomenological 
perspective on illness. It has helped us to better understand and take seriously the 
experiences of mental disorders such as autism (Chapman and Veit, 2020) and 
schizophrenia (Kendler, 2016). What we want to argue for here, however, is that 
we can extend these arguments to our fellow creatures: non-human animals. We 
will begin with some recent empirical work on phantom complex in canines. 
4 Measuring Animal Phenomenology 
One of the biggest concerns in defending an account of animal phenomenology is 
how it is that we might gain access to information about the phenomenal states of 
animals. After all, these states are necessarily private, and unlike humans, animals 
cannot tell us about their experience. However, there are a number of emerging 
methods that can tell us about animal phenomenology, and their experiences of 
health and welfare. 
As we discussed above, phantom limbs are a crucial support point in the 
application of phenomenology to human illness, and we will now turn to whether 
 
8 See Browning (2017, 2018a,b). 
 phenomenology can illuminate PC in non-human animals. Recent work by 
Menchetti et al. (2017) on PC in dogs is the first of its kind. While there has been 
prior work on the ability of small animals with amputated legs to adapt and the 
impact on their welfare (Kirpensteijn et al., 1999; Dickerson et al., 2015; Raske et 
al,. 2015), no work has focused on the question of whether they are able to 
experience phantom limbs. Menchetti et al. (2017) created a survey for dog 
owners in order to “identify signs and behaviors suggestive of neuropathic pain, 
evaluate risk factors associated with PC occurrence, and determine the owners’ 
perceptions of the quality of life (QoL) of their 3-legged pets” (25). In their design, 
they oriented themselves on the work in humans, through use of similar 
questionnaires and behavioural assessments. Their results indicated some striking 
similarities to self-reports made by humans after amputations. Some canines, for 
instance, underwent personality changes after the amputation of their limbs, 
showing increased aggression and anxiety where it is not clear whether this must 
be related to pain.9 These novel results are interesting. As Carel (2011) notes, 
“mood as an existential category is a significant dimension of illness” (44). There 
is no reason to think that at least some higher vertebrates do not have perhaps a 
proto-form of such existential experiences.10 
A phenomenology in the style of Carel might thus very well hold the key to 
understanding such behavioural and emotional changes in animals. Could it be 
possible that a dog experiences anger, fear, and frustration after no longer being 
able to experience his life the way his body previously enabled him to? Our answer 
suggests a resounding yes. We see no reason to think that this bodily experience 
would be different for humans than for other mammals.11  
A possible experiment for this could be to test whether animals with 
amputations change their “view of the world” – here drawing on the literature on 
optimism and pessimism in animals. As we will discuss below, it has been shown 
that animals that have experienced primarily negative states (environments with 
low reward opportunities) are subject to seeing ambiguous signals as threats, and 
thus treat the epistemic likelihood of events more ‘pessimistically’ (and the 
reverse true for positive states and optimism) (Mendl et al., 2010). An animal’s 
mood state “may thus act as a heuristic device influencing cognitive processes and 
facilitating appropriate decision-making behaviour” (Mendl et al., 2010, 2900) 
 
9 Menchetti et al. (2017) note that similar results were found in Kirpensteijn et al. (1999). 
10 For moral concerns, however, it is not relevant whether the animals in question have 
high cognitive capacities and understand their disease in any sophisticated way - what 
matters is whether they suffer (Dawkins 2001; Browning 2019c). 
11 The jury is still out on other vertebrates, and invertebrates. 
 and further serve as an indicator for an animal's assessment of its own sense of 
‘being in the world’. 
Menchetti et al. (2017) conclude their paper with a recognition that the 
“ability to recognize behavioral signs that may indicate the presence of unpleasant 
sensations related to neuropathic pain would be of great interest, to prevent and 
treat it” (27). Neuropathic pain (i.e. unprompted pain without any apparent cause) 
is notoriously difficult to understand in humans, but even more so in non-human 
animals, since they cannot verbalize their discomfort in the same way humans do 
(Mathews 2008). Some animals - for instance those with a high tolerance for pain, 
or prey animals that evolved to hide their weakness from predators - may show no 
external signs of pain, despite actually suffering.  
Now one might wonder what the phenomenological role or component in 
such studies is. We think it is substantial.12 As Carel (2011) notes, embodied 
phenomenology is importantly different: 
 
Phenomenology, in its embodied understanding of human being, 
differs from other first-person approaches such as certain narrative 
approaches and qualitative interviews. This is particularly important 
when we come to think of actual research methods [...] that go beyond 
verbal accounts. They may use ‘walking with’ exercises, videotaping 
(thus including nonverbal information about bodily movement and 
gestures), and reports relating sensual and perceptual experiences 
(e.g., looking at changes to sense of taste). 
Havi Carel (2011, 41) 
Such qualitative measures are empirical and do not necessitate verbal responses. 
They are nevertheless phenomenological and could be applied to animals. Indeed, 
we argue that there already exist such qualitative phenomenological tools for the 
assessment of an animal's experience.  
Perhaps the most promising of these is Qualitative Behavioural Assessment 
(QBA) (Wemelsfelder et al., 2001). QBA is a profiling method through which 
trained observers are able to take a whole-body approach to assess the overall 
experience of an animal. Observers watch an animal as it interacts with its 
environment, incorporating its behaviour and body language into a judgement 
about the animal. 
 
12 There will always persist a danger in trying to over-rationalize the behavior of other 
life-forms (Veit et al. 2020; Veit 2019a) and we suggest tackling this problem with pluralism, 
rather than a-priori limitations. We expand on this point in the conclusion. 
 These assessments can be transformed into quantitative scoring methods 
with quite high reliability for applications in animal husbandry and welfare 
(Browning 2020). This holistic approach uses the observer as a “research 
instrument” (Beausoleil and Mellor 2011, 457), who unconsciously integrates 
incoming information from the behaviour and body language of the animal to form 
an overall picture about its experience. The individual behaviours themselves are 
not the focus, instead it is the style of behaviour, the way in which the animal 
moves through and interacts with its environment. It is a whole-body measure, 
reflecting the overall state of the animal; an integrated output of the various 
experiences and the way in which they impact the animal as a whole. This method 
has shown high reliability, with different observers giving similar assessments, 
and strong correlation with other established indicators of animal health and 
welfare (Fleming et al., 2016). It seems that, as human animals, we are responding 
to our own intuitive understanding of phenomenological experiencing and its 
impact on being and action. This method relies heavily on the relationship between 
experiencing and acting, between mind and body, that underpins the 
phenomenological tradition.13 
Another successful method for understanding animal experience as it 
pertains to welfare is cognitive bias testing. Here, we can usefully refer back to 
our discussion of an animal's mood above. The processes of cognition can alter in 
response to experience in measurable ways and cognitive bias testing takes 
advantage of this fact (Mendl et al., 2010). In these tests, animals are trained such 
that they will expect a reward when perceiving one stimulus, such as the arrival 
of some food when a light appears in the left corner of the room, and a punishment 
under another, such as a puff of air in the face when a light appears in the right 
corner. When the animals are presented with an ambiguous signal - a light 
somewhere in the middle of the room - the way they perceive and react to this will 
depend on their previous experience. Animals that have had positive experiences, 
and thus high welfare, will behave optimistically, as though they are about to 
receive a reward. Animals that have had prior negative experiences, with 
corresponding low welfare, will behave pessimistically and anticipate the 
punishment. Thus, the degree of optimistic or pessimistic bias exhibited will tell 
us about the overall mood or state of subjective welfare of the animal, regarding 
the total of its previous life experiences. 
 
13 The ‘subjective’ welfare concept grounding these measures stands in contrast with the 
historically behaviorist welfare concept that sought to ground animal welfare in their 
teleological ‘natural behaviour’ and is, for instance, now being applied in zoos (Browning 
2019a; Browning and Maple 2019). 
 Since all experiences are embodied experiences, there is no reason to think 
that a negative change to the body wouldn’t lead to negative mental states. 
Negative bodily changes, such as the loss of a limb, or presence of disease, will 
create negative mental states such as pain, nausea, fear or anxiety. The presence 
of these mental states will have an impact on overall mood. Any experience that 
has an impact on mental states will then be detectable with this sort of testing, to 
find whether an animal has experienced a change in its embodied phenomenology. 
As the large literature on self-medication behaviour in animals (see Neco et 
al. 2019) suggests, animals may be acutely aware that something has ‘gone wrong’ 
with their bodies. For example, rodents in pain will voluntarily self-administer 
analgesic medications when given the opportunity (Martin and Ewan 2008). As 
another example, wild primates will treat internal parasites by eating whole leaves 
and external parasites by rubbing their skin with acidic plant parts, and even in 
some cases with millipedes (Neco et al. 2019). The phenomenological experiences 
of animals, the positive and negative experiences that constitute welfare, do not 
just impact the body, but also the workings of the mind itself, in ways the animals 
respond to. 
 
 
5 Implications for our Treatment of Animals 
The phenomenology (i.e. subjective experience) of different animals might be 
radically different from one another, and thus have an impact on how we should 
treat these animals. One of us (Browning 2019b), has previously argued that the 
different phenomenological experiences of octopuses should make us reluctant to 
create ethical standards, legislation, and regulations, for the protection of 
cephalopods without taking their different experiences into account. 
Lights which appear gentle to the human eye may not be so within 
the octopus perceptual range, so light polarisation should also be 
measured and taken into account. Chemicals within the tank can 
affect health but may also be pleasant or aversive in ways we may not 
usually consider. Chemosensory enrichment opportunities could 
open up new avenues of exploration. Vibrations through the water 
can have a large impact on octopus health and welfare (e.g., André et 
al. 2011), with “noise and vibration control” forming a core part of 
the guidelines for octopus husbandry […] 
– Heather Browning (2019b, 34) 
 These results suggest that a phenomenological approach to animal health and 
ethics is a useful one – gaining attention both among scientists and the public.14 
Low-frequency sounds have been shown to induce acoustic trauma in octopuses 
and are thus of relevance to cephalopod pathology (André et al. 2011; AZA 
Aquatic Invertebrate Taxon Advisory Group (AITAG) 2014; Fiorito et al. 2014). 
Indeed, the above paper emphasizes this conclusion by making an explicitly 
phenomenological point: “it is only by trying to see the world from their point of 
view that we will be able to find out what is good for them and hence ensure their 
welfare” (Browning 2019b, 2). A further issue in which the phenomenological 
perspective will be relevant, is the debate surrounding euthanasia (Browning 
2018b) and slaughter of animals (Browning & Veit, 2020). If an animal can be 
happy despite being in a pathological state, this should give us pause in accepting 
euthanasia of sick animals as unproblematic. ‘Taking the viewpoint’ of an animal 
is no longer seen as merely metaphorical, but it is a genuine scientific method 
towards understanding our fellow creatures, with real and important implications 
for how we should treat them if we want to ensure their wellbeing. 
6 Conclusion 
As one of us has argued in previous publications (Veit 2020a,d), science thrives 
by creating a vast range of different lenses, models, and tools offering different 
perspectives on the phenomena under investigation. Early phenomenologists had 
some anti-scientific (or at least anti-reductionist) attitudes, thinking that 
philosophers and scientists left out an important domain of life - i.e. our subjective 
and embodied experience.15 Now, both scientists and philosophers within the 
mainstream have begun to take this strand of thought more seriously. This can 
only be recommended. There is no simple either-or in this domain, even if 
philosophers seem to trip easily into seeing the matter in black and white. 
A phenomenological approach to animals is thus promising for revealing 
relevant facts not only about what it is like to be a bat, an octopus, or a human in 
a pathological state, but also what we should do in relation to their welfare – an 
issue that is of importance in bioethics. ‘Perspectival pluralism’ in the sense of 
Giere (2006), Massimi (2012), and Veit (2020a,d, 2019b) will help us to better 
understand our non-human neighbours by embracing a plurality of alternative 
perspectives; phenomenology being one of them. We thus hope to have dispelled 
 
14 See Veit (2020b,c); Veit and Harnad (2020); Veit and Rowan (2020). 
15 See also Rosenberg (2011) and Veit (2018a). 
 at least some of the initial reservations among those who regarded phenomenology 
as a practice solely applicable to humans. Animal experience is real and needs to 
be taken seriously – both for ethical and scientific purposes. While we cannot 
literally hear their voices, there are good phenomenological, yet nevertheless 
qualitative empirical methods, that can help us to, at least indirectly, make them 
heard.  
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